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I. Introduction

We cannot stop natural calamities, but we can and must better equip individuals
and communities to withstand them. Those most vulnerable to nature’s wrath are
usually the poorest, which means that when we reduce poverty, we also reduce
vulnerability.
- Kofi Annan, Former UN Secretary-General, October 12, 2005
Kofi Annan’s 2005 International Day for Disaster Reduction message followed a year of
natural catastrophes including, among others, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami that
claimed over 280,000 lives, drought and locust plagues across Africa, devastating
hurricanes and cyclones in the United States and Caribbean (including Hurricane
Katrina), and heavy flooding across Europe and Asia. Annan’s message focused on
recognizing the potential of micro-finance to reduce disaster risk and to improve disaster
management; he promoted disaster micro-insurance as an “innovative approach” in this
field (Annan, 2005).
This message reflects the shifting focus from ex poste disaster aid to ex ante
assistance in risk mitigation and risk financing. Stronger focus on preemptive mitigation
and financing strategies is increasingly important in what experts are calling a “new era
of large-scale catastrophes;” in recent years, extreme weather events have been occurring
at an accelerating pace (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2008). Over the past fifty years
there have been significantly increasing trends in economic losses, insured losses, and
fatalities from natural catastrophes around the world (Appendix A, Figure 1). The
primary drivers of these trends are changes in land use and increasing concentration of
people and capital in vulnerable areas (Mechler, 2005). The Intergovernmental Panel on
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Climate Change’s (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report also concludes that climate change
has likely contributed to increasing incidences of natural catastrophes (IPCC 2007).
The impacts of these natural catastrophes are most devastating and enduring in
developing countries. 90% of the most devastating disasters between 1970 and 2007,
ranked by number of victims, occurred in developing countries (Hochrainer et al, 2009)
(Appendix A, Table 1). In absolute terms, economic losses due to natural catastrophes are
greatest in developed countries, as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
however, catastrophes inflict higher proportional losses in developing countries. A major
natural catastrophe in an industrialized country will have a minor impact on GDP (e.g.
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 resulted in a 1.1% GDP loss in the United States); at the other
extreme, small island nations can incur damages representing several times their annual
GDP (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2008) (Appendix A, Table 2).
High fatality rates and high proportional GDP losses are two indicators of the
destruction caused by natural catastrophes in developing countries. The impact of natural
catastrophes in these countries, however, is much greater and enduring than these
measures may imply. Natural catastrophes prohibit economic development and
exacerbate cyclical poverty; in the event of a natural catastrophe, the poor may have to
sell assets (e.g. livestock), spend savings or default on loans, and cope with concurrent
shocks such as illness (Mechler et al, 2006). Many rely on family networks for support,
but families are often geographically concentrated and have highly covariant exposures to
natural catastrophes. Furthermore, foreign investment in developing countries remains
low partially because investors are averse to taking on the risk of loosing infrastructure
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investments, and small firms and farms are unable to access credit to invest in higherrisk, higher-yield activities (Mechler et al, 2006).
The closer that a community’s livelihood is tied to the weather, the greater its
exposure to risk of climatic variability and extremes; for example, many rural
communities in sub-Saharan Africa rely largely on rain-fed agriculture or pastoralism and
struggle to cope with climatic variability (Cooper et al, 2008).

These vulnerable

populations face immense challenges to adapting to climate change. This research paper
focuses on developing flexible, long-term strategies for reducing vulnerability, improving
resilience, and enabling adaptation to natural catastrophes and climate change of such
farmers in the West African country of Senegal.
Section II discusses the decline of agriculture in Senegal and the climatic
conditions currently faced by the Senegalese farmers. Section III addresses the predicted
impacts of climate change on West Africa and the West African agricultural sector.
Section IV discusses the development of agricultural insurance internationally as well as
highlights a successful index-based insurance pilot program in Malawi. It also highlights
challenges to establishing agricultural insurance in developing countries and suggests
criteria for designing agricultural insurance programs. Section V explains the
development of agricultural insurance in Senegal and issues with the current country
strategy. Section VI discusses stated needs of Senegalese farmers and an innovative food
security program being developed in the country. Section VII builds on Section V
through a proposed long-term strategy for developing agricultural insurance in Senegal.
Section VIII offers some concluding remarks of the author.
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II. Current Climatic Conditions and the Agricultural Sector in Senegal

Senegal is located in West Africa, one of the most food-insecure regions in the
world (Brown et al 2009). According to the World Food Program’s 2009 Hunger Map,
undernourishment is “Moderately High” in Senegal, with between 20-34% of the
population chronically undernourished (WFP 2009). Approximately 58% of the
Senegalese population lives rurally; 70% of this rural population depends on agriculture
(Mahul et al 2009). Despite rural inhabitants’ high dependence on agriculture, agriculture
comprises less than 10% of Senegal’s GDP. The productivity of this sector has been
steadily declining over the past 25 years: average yearly crop loss values have increased
from about 5% in 1986 to approximately 14% in 2008 (Mahul et al 2009), and Peace
Corps estimates that current average yields of Senegal’s main crops are 2-6 times less
than their potential (Peace Corps 2009).
The Senegalese agricultural sector is comprised primarily of smallholder farmers
practicing rain-fed cultivation; currently less than 5% of cropped area is irrigated (Mahul
et al 2009). As the primary irrigated crop, rice enjoys much more stable production than
the other seven main Senegalese crops: millet, groundnut, maize, sorghum, cotton,
cassava, and cowpea. These seven crops are highly exposed to drought and/or flooding,
and their yearly production varies greatly with the weather. According to a 2004 survey
of 1500 rural households conducted by a consultant to the Senegalese Government,
approximately 30% of rain-fed Senegalese farmers reported drought as the primary cause
of crop loss, followed by insects (16%) and diseases (13%) (Mahul et al 2009).
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Rainfall is spatially, temporally, and interannually highly variable in Senegal. The
rainy season lasts from June through October and the dry season from November through
May. The rainy season in the north of the country is approximately two months shorter
than that in the south of the country. Historically, the southern-most regions of Senegal
receive up to 1300 mm of rain per year and the northern-most regions of the country
receive less than 300 mm of rain per year, with departments receiving more rain the
further south that they are located (Roux and Sagna 2000). See Appendix A, Figure 2 for
a country map of rainfall. During the period 1986 to 2003, however, in many departments
average rainfall was significantly lower than the long-term average. Rainfall is also
highly variable between years. In the northern-most departments, the coefficient of
variation for rainfall can be as high as 40-45%, decreasing to 30-35% in the central
departments, and falling to 25% in the southern departments. During the aforementioned
period of lower-than-average rainfall, rainfall tended to be less variable between years
(Mahul et al 2009). See Appendix A, Table 3 for these data.
Commercial agriculture is only possible in the northern regions of Senegal
because of irrigation from the Senegal River; rain-fed agriculture is concentrated in the
central and southern regions of Senegal. As noted above, rice is the primary irrigated
crop. Millet is the most-grown rain-fed crop, consisting of 36% of total average
cultivated area. While millet is primarily a food crop, the second-most grown crop,
groundnut, which covers an average of 32% of total cultivated area, is both a food and a
cash crop (Mahul et al 2009). The remaining crops, cotton, sorghum, maize, rice, cowpea,
and cassava, all contribute less than 10% each to total cultivated area. The long-term
trend of decreasing cropped area has continued recently, total cultivated area has declined
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from 2.25 million hectares in 2005/06 to 1.95 million hectares in 2007/08 (Appendix A,
Table 4). The production of some crops, such as cowpea (primarily used for animal feed),
millet, and groundnut saw the greatest decreases in area cultivated, while the area
cultivated for a couple of others, such as cassava and maize, actually increased (Mahul et
al 2009).
Although rainfall variability explains a large portion of the weak Senegalese
agricultural sector, it is not the sole factor impacting production. A variety of factors
interact to decrease production, including price instability of agricultural products,
decreasing soil fertility and deterioration of ecosystems, limited interest of the private
sector to invest in agriculture, and limited access to agricultural credit for farmers (Mahul
et al 2009). Indeed, Chris Hendrick, the Director of Peace Corps Senegal, notes that
Peace Corps volunteers have found that although low production is usually attributed to
low rainfall, poor soil quality is also very much to blame; Peace Corps volunteers have
implemented environmental education and agro-forestry programs to combat this
problem (2010). The combination of these factors and climatic variability has resulted in
the Senegalese agricultural sector being “left behind.” Yields have remained low and
variable for the past 50 years (with the exception of rice), with no consistent yield
increase trends. Over the past 10 to 15 years, groundnut yield has trended downward
(Mahul et al 2009). See Appendix A, Figure 3 for national average yields of major crops
from 1970/71 to 2007/08.
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III. Predicted Impacts of Climate Change on West Africa and Agriculture

An outdated agricultural sector is not unique to Senegal. West African countries
have largely suffered the same low productivity and yields (Appendix A, Figure 3) and
the region is a net food importer (Brown et al 2009). The poor performance of the West
African agricultural sector leaves it highly vulnerable to climate change. Rising
temperatures and changing rainfall patterns may reduce agricultural output by 28% by
2080, exacerbating food insecurity and malnutrition (Willoughby et al 2009).
Temperatures have been rising in Africa faster than the global average, and this trend is
expected to continue. Although temperature increase varies with region, Senegal is
located in a low elevation, semi-arid zone that is expected to warm more than the moister
tropics (there is some sub-humid territory in the south of the country). Temperatures are
rising during all seasons; Senegal could see yearly average temperatures rise by 3-5°
Celsius by the end of this century (Conway 2009).
The stress induced by higher temperatures will be compounded by more variable
rainfall. Although experts agree that rainfall extremes such as flooding and drought will
occur more often, there is no consensus on whether yearly rainfall will increase or
decrease in Senegal (Conway 2009). A recent report for the World Bank, for example,
uses two different Atmospheric-Oceanic Global Circulation Models, the Canadian
Climate Centre (CCC) and the Parallel Climate Model (PCM), with the A2 Emissions
Scenario from the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC). Although both predict that on average, summer rainfall decreases and
winter rainfall increases, the CCC model predicts a 15% annual decrease in mean rainfall
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and the PCM a 10% annual increase in mean rainfall (Seo et al 2008). See Appendix A,
Figure 5 for temperature and rainfall maps illustrating these predictions.
It is difficult to asses the extent to which climate change will impact African
farmers. The aforementioned analysis by a World Bank team predicts that depending on
the scenario, climate change benefits farmers in certain climate zones and hurt farmers in
others. Because of Senegal’s location at the juncture of multiple climate zones (Appendix
A, Figure 6), it is especially unclear what the impact of climate change will be on the
country. It is likely, however, that different regions in Senegal will experience varied
climatic changes. Higher temperatures and decreasing summer rainfall, for example, will
pose challenges to rain-fed farmers in central and northern Senegal who already
experience drought stress. Many other environmental factors affected by climate change,
such as soil nutrients and carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere, will also
impact crop production (Rasmussen 2001). The extent to which farmers are affected by
climate change will depend on their location as well as their ability to adapt.

IV. International Experience with Agricultural Insurance

In recent years, index-based agricultural insurance programs have been growing
in popularity among non-profit and international organizations as well as developing
country governments seeking to reduce farmers’ vulnerability to weather extremes. These
products are also being used to enable farmers to access agricultural credit (Mapfumo
2008). Index-based agricultural insurance is distinct from traditional agricultural
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insurance, which has a long history in industrialized countries (e.g. United States and
Canada) as well as some developing countries (e.g. India and Mexico).
Traditional agricultural insurance is often sold to individual farmers in namedperil or multiple peril crop insurance (MPCI) forms. Named-peril insurance products,
such as hail insurance, have successfully been sold through the private market. MPCI,
however, is very costly to administer because the multitude of risks covered requires farm
visits to determine the level of loss (Mahul et al 2009). The dilemma with MPCI
programs is that adequate monitoring to control adverse selection and moral hazard is
very costly, but if these problems are not addressed, indemnities will likely exceed
collected premiums. In both cases, these programs require high levels of government
subsidization to ensure availability of MPCI and to encourage farmer participation
(Mahul et al 2009).
The high cost of traditional agricultural insurance programs spurred the
development of index-based products that are more affordably administered in
developing countries. An index-based insurance product is based on a measurable
parameter, such as yield or rainfall, and farmers receive a payout when the index is below
a specified trigger, regardless of actual losses in their fields. Appendix 2, Figure 1
illustrates this product. Benefits of this product includes less moral hazard and adverse
selection, lower administrative costs, standardized and transparent structure, availability
and negotiability, reinsurance capability, and versatility (Mahul et al 2009). The primary
challenge of this product is basis risk, or lack of correlation between the index and actual
losses. Other challenges to developing index-based insurance in developing countries
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modeling,

education,

market

size,

weather

cycles,

microclimates, and forecasts (Mahul et al 2009).
Index-based agricultural insurance is just beginning to develop in Africa; in the
past decade, there have been a number of pilot programs in African countries supported
by organizations such as the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program, and
large non-profit organizations (e.g. Oxfam). A 2009 study by the Microinsurance
Innovation Facility found that less than 80,000 people in Africa are covered by
agricultural insurance products (including livestock, crop, and agriculture-related index
products); this number represents less than 0.1% of the potential market for these
products. The study concludes, however, that index-based products, “…offer the potential
of a major breakthrough for agriculture” (Matul et al).
Recent notable index-based insurance pilot programs include a small 2006 pilot
program by the World Bank Commodities Risk Management Group (CRMG) in Ethiopia
that had some success and highlighted challenges to establishing agricultural insurance
programs (Bryla 2009). A more relevant and very successful pilot program in Malawi in
2005/2006 also employed a weather-index product in a bundled package with a loan for
agricultural inputs (Suarez et al 2007). This program will be discussed at length in the
paragraphs below. In 2009 the United Nations Development Program began a partnership
with multiple organizations in Mali to establish an agricultural insurance program with
the goal of improving food security. Appendix 2, Table 1 contains an in-depth
examination of these and other pilot and established agricultural insurance programs in
developing countries.
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Index-based agricultural insurance products take many forms. The product offered
depends on the risks confronting farmers as well as the goals of the program offering the
insurance. As noted above, one program that is most relevant to an initial stage of
agricultural insurance in Senegal is the 2005/2006 Malawi pilot. Malawi has a large rural
population that is dependent on rain-fed farming. Since 1970, increasingly frequent
floods and droughts are blamed for exacerbating poverty levels and trapping many rural
farmers in a cycle of poverty and vulnerability. The removal of subsidies and
privatization of seed companies have also blocked smallholder farmers’ access to quality
inputs. For these and other reasons, Malawi is one of the most food-insecure countries in
Southern Africa (Suarez et al 2007).
Recognizing the challenging weather conditions and market failures facing
smallholder farmers, the World Bank CRMG, in collaboration with local stakeholders
and assisted by the International Research Institute for Climate and Society (IRI) piloted
a weather insurance scheme to enhance groundnut farmers’ ability to manage drought
risk and to access credit (Suarez et al 2007). Farmers in four villages were offered
bundled loan and insurance contracts designed to transfer the risk of rainfall deficit
during the growing season to the insurer; 982 farmers decided to participate. Suarez et al
illustrate the structure of the pilot through a series of 11 steps, which are listed below and
illustrated in Appendix 2, Figure 1.
Step 1: Farmer and his respective local farmers’ club agree to join scheme.
Step 2: Farmer enters into a loan agreement with the local bank. A weather
insurance premium is bundled with his loan. When a farmer joins the scheme, he
commits to selling his harvest to the National Smallholder Farmers Association of
Malawi (NASFAM) at the end of the season (ensuring a market for his harvest as
well as repayment of his loan).
Step 3: Insurance is purchased on behalf of the NASFAM clubs.
Step 4: Farmer signs a form authorizing the bank to pay NASFAM for the seeds.
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Step 5: NASFAM distributes the groundnut seed to participating clubs.
Step 6: NASFAM is paid for seed expense by the bank.
Step 7: At the end of the growing season, the rainfall information collected by the
Malawi Meteorological Service is distributed to the insurer, NASFAM, and the
bank.
Step 8: If insufficient rainfall triggers payouts, then the corresponding payout is
given by the insurer to the correct bank.
Step 9: Farmer sells groundnut crops to NASFAM.
Step 10: NASFAM pays off loan balance to the bank.
Step 11: Any additional revenue from the sale is given to the farmers’ club.
There are a few notable features of this structure. First, farmers do not handle money
unless they receive additional revenue from the sale of their crops at the end of the
growing season. NASFAM repays the entire loan balance unless the index is triggered, in
which case the insurer repays part of the loan. Second, the insurance contract in this
scheme is a vehicle for farmers to access credit for seed inputs; without this insurance
contract, local banks are not willing to lend to farmers because of the risk of default in the
case of drought. Thus, the insurance contract assures that the bank will receive repayment
as well as interest on its loan while protecting farmers from defaulting in the case of
drought. Third, although the bundled loan contract is signed by individual farmers,
farmers’ clubs are collectively liable to cover the deficit of any member farmers who do
not deliver their crops to NASFAM; using social collateral to ensure repayment of loans
is a core concept of micro-finance (Suarez et al 2007).
Contracts in the pilot were sold in units of 32 kilograms of hybrid groundnuts
(worth about $28.80 US), which plants 0.5 acres, a small part of the farmer’s total
cultivated land. Although the insurance premium and the interest on the loan constitute
approximately 10% of farmers’ expected revenue (without drought), the farmer could still
expect a significantly higher net profit than with traditional seeds (Suarez et al 2007). See
Appendix 2, Table 2 for the economics of the bundled package. In the case of no drought,
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farmers could expect a net gain of $63.78 on the package, compared to $30.72 with
traditional seeds. In the case of drought, farmers would not loose with the hybrid seed
package, but would loose $10.24 with traditional seeds (Suarez et al 2007). In the context
of farmers with little to no accumulated wealth, this difference could significantly impact
their families’ well-being.
Another major benefit to this program is that it does not rely on direct
subsidization. Although the World Bank covered a substantial amount of start-up and
administrative expenditures, the program did not require any direct premium
subsidization. In light of the high costs that governments typically incur to subsidize
agricultural insurance programs, this advantage could be very beneficial for the upscaling
and the sustainability of similar agricultural insurance programs. As the economics of this
program clearly highlight, it is a major advancement for index-based insurance in Africa.
A World Bank representative went as far as to state:
This is a breakthrough. We want farmers to adopt high return technologies
that allow them finally to make the leap and accumulate earnings over
time. Correlated risk is the factor impeding this…This Malawi transaction
shows that there is a sustainable way to take the big rocks out of the way –
drought risks – and clear the path to development! (in Suarez et al 2009)
Despite its success, the Malawi program highlighted some challenges to
establishing agricultural insurance programs in developing countries. The system depends
on higher quality seeds being made available to farmers; if seeds are defective, then the
high costs of the loan interest and insurance premium will hurt farmers. The scheme
actually experienced this problem, but it was quickly remedied by NASFAM (Suarez et
al 2007). Another important issue is price volatility of agricultural products. If the market
price for crops is higher at the end of the growing season than the pre-agreed contract
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price, then farmers will be reluctant to sell their crops to NASFAM. As a result, farmers
may side-sell crops to other traders. Although market price was higher than contract price
at the end of the 2005/2006 season, only a few farmers broke their contract with
NASFAM; the incident revealed, however, that the system is vulnerable to this problem
(Suarez et al 2007).
NASFAM played a central role in insuring the success of this program; although
it had the institutional capacity to handle its responsibility, it is unique to Malawi, and it
may be difficult finding comparable organizations in other developing countries.
Furthermore, because NASFAM is the essential bridge between the banks and insurers
and the farmers, it must be trusted by both groups. If this trust erodes, the whole system is
at risk. Finally, some farmers were disappointed when the insurance did not pay out,
which demonstrated their incomplete understanding of the function of insurance. This
problem may also reflect basis risk in the insurance system. Measurements of rainfall at
two farms seven kilometers away from each other within 20 km of a weather station were
much lower than the rainfall measured at the weather station (Suarez et al 2007).
The Malawi example highlights some important benefits and challenges to
agricultural insurance programs. Discussing other agricultural insurance programs in
detail is beyond the scope of this paper, although some key insights from these
experiences can be noted:


Farmer education is imperative: Farmers lack understanding of insurance and
financial products and mistrust insurance companies. Smallholder farmers are
often unwilling to pay premiums for a stand-alone product and do not understand
why premiums are not returned if there is no payout (Mapfumo, 2008).
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Market-structure matters: Improving resilience to natural disasters and increasing
yields can not fix other market failures that farmers encounter. Agricultural
insurance works best in conjunction with other strategies to address market issues.



Basis risk is always a concern: As discussed above, basis risk is a primary
concern when designing index-based contracts. Many countries lack sufficient
data for large-scale agricultural insurance programs, and investment in new
technology, cleaning of data, and upgrading of infrastructure is necessary (Bryla
2009). Furthermore, experience in the field shows that even with continual
minimization of basis risk, farmers will believe that local weather-station data
does not accurately reflect climatic conditions on their farms (Mahul 2010).



Delivery channels, partner organizations, and insurers may lack capacity: It can
be difficult to find a delivery channel with sufficient balance of interest in the
product, outreach to the farmers, and technical capacity to serve as the partner and
intermediary for an agricultural insurance product (Bryla 2009). Different types of
organizations may have strengths in different countries (i.e. MFIs have strong
presences in some countries, farmers’ clubs in others, and cooperatives in still
others), and multiple channels should be considered. National insurance
companies likely lack experience in agricultural insurance and may be reticent to
take on risk in this area. They may also lack skills in product design and require
training to design products that are appropriate for their clients’ risk.



There is little empirical research on the impacts of agricultural insurance on
farmers’ livelihoods. A small, informal survey of smallholder farmers in Malawi
conducted by the private insurance intermediary MicroEnsure found that those
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who participated in the bundled loan/insurance scheme reported significant
increases in yields as well as cultivated areas on farm. All farmers also introduced
at least one cash crop; some reported investing in barns, oxen, home expansion, or
carts. Others noted sending their children to school and opening savings accounts
(Mapfumo 2008). This survey is anecdotal and likely represents a best-case
scenario.
The Malawi experience and these insights highlight that there are both benefits and
challenges to developing agricultural insurance programs. As noted by Mahul and
Stutley, agricultural insurance is part of a comprehensive risk management framework; it
can contribute to the modernization of agriculture. Agricultural insurance can not,
however, operate in isolation (2010).
A recent report by the Economics of Climate Adaption (ECA) Working Group
proposes systematic, risk-management based approaches for policy-makers to minimize
the impacts of climate change on society. The report utilizes agricultural insurance in
cost-effective adaptation portfolios for its agriculturally-focused case studies. In a case
study on Maharashtra, India, for example, the ECA Working Group recommends a
portfolio of strategies to adapt Maharashtra’s agricultural sector, including irrigation
systems, farming techniques, crop engineering, and insurance (2009). The portfolio is
illustrated in Appendix 2, Figure 3. It is clear that this approach to agricultural insurance,
including agricultural insurance as part of a portfolio of strategies to improve farmers’
resilience to climatic variability and change, is necessary for it to be sustainable to and to
have a long-term impact.
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Based on the discussion of agricultural insurance above, four criteria can be
enumerated that a sustainable agricultural insurance program that can be scaled up must
meet: location-specific, integrative, goal-oriented, and long-term, but flexible.


Location-specific encompasses multiple factors; the climatic risks of a region
must be well-understood and well-modeled and used to create appropriate
products. The local culture must be considered when assessing the demand for the
product; furthermore, studies show that trust can be enhanced by stakeholder
participation in the design and implementation of insurance systems and products
(Mechler, Linnerooth-Bayer, and Peppiatt 2006). Community partnership should
be sought from the initial stages of program design. Working with an organization
that is well-regarded and established in the community will help to obtain locals’
trust and participation in the program.



Agricultural insurance must be integrated at two levels. At the local level, it must
be used with other strategies to improve farmers’ resilience to climate variability
and change. This point may be the single-most important component of improving
farmers’ livelihoods in the long-run. As stated by agro-climatologist Bertrand
Muller, who works in Senegal for CIRAD, a French research organization of
agriculture for development, agricultural insurance must be paired with access to
improved inputs and well-managed farms for it to be effective (2010). This point
will be expanded below. At a higher level, the risk from agricultural insurance
programs should be pooled in the international reinsurance market. The second
integration mentioned above, pooling of risk at the international level, will reduce
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risk to local insurers who are reticent to offer agricultural insurance because of the
high risk that it carries.


Goal-orientation must also occur on multiple levels. Core goals of the program
must be defined (e.g. short-term to enable farmers to access credit, long-term to
increase yields and to improve food security), as well as operational goals (e.g. x
groundnut farmers purchase insurance in year 1), and finally, farmers’ goals. This
third set of goals could be elicited from farmers by having them participate in
educational programs that will help them to improve farming techniques and to
gradually increase their yields and production.



A long-term strategy is essential for the development of agricultural insurance and
agricultural markets. Furthermore, without a long-term approach, the impacts of
climate change may not be considered in the design of the program, and it may
fail to enable farmers’ adaptation to climate change. A long-term approach will
facilitate the development of products that meet the needs of farmers with varying
levels of experience with agricultural insurance and will enable innovation in
product design, delivery channels, etc. This long-term strategy must be flexible,
however, given the changing climate and often unstable social and political
environment of developing countries. Flexibility may take many forms; for
example, the program could offer incentives to farmers to grow crops that are
more suitable for the changing climate.
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V. Agricultural Insurance in Senegal

The Senegalese Government has been interested in developing agricultural
insurance for many years. Its first report on agricultural insurance was published in 2004
and recommended insurable farms and crops and a series of products to be piloted. In
2007, the Insurance Supervisory Division of the Senegalese Government commissioned a
report that suggested the establishment of a specialized agricultural insurance company as
well as area-yield and drought index-based insurance. This report lacked, however,
adequate technical and operational insight to be implemented, so the Ministry of Finance
requested that the World Bank conduct a feasibility study of index-based insurance in
Senegal and provide recommendations for its development (Mahul et al 2009).
The World Bank’s feasibility study, conducted from 2008 to 2009, provided
insights on a range of technical and operational issues. The study included a formal crop
risk assessment model for Senegal (called MARCS); it found that area-yield as well as
drought index-based insurance are technically feasible in Senegal under certain
conditions. It advised that these products be developed gradually after pilot programs for
groundnut and millet in some of the smaller administrative districts with relatively stable
climatic conditions. It also recommended that the specialized agricultural insurance
company proposed in the Insurance Supervisory Division’s report, a public-private
partnership, be provided with extensive technical support and rely less on direct
government subsidization of insurance premiums (set at 50%) (Mahul et al 2009).
During the researching and writing of this study, the Senegalese Government
continued developing the National Agricultural Insurance Company of Senegal
(CNAAS) in partnership with domestic insurance companies, farmer organizations, and
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regional reinsurers (Ndiaye 2009). CNAAS was created in July, 2008, approved by the
regional insurance regulator, the Inter-African Conference for the Insurance Market
(CIMA) in December, 2008, and authorized by the Minister of Finance in February 2009
(Ndiaye 2010).
According to the Director of CNAAS, Amadou Ndiouga Ndiaye, the products and
development strategy recommended in the World Bank study were too limited, so
CNAAS used them as models but expanded them to create its products (2010). CNAAS
sells crop insurance for groundnuts, rice, cotton, maize, millet, and sorghum. It offers
multiple products for each crop: all-risk area yield-based insurance (covers drought,
brush fires/heat waves, flooding/excessive rain, and locust invasion), named peril area
yield-based insurance (available for fire, excessive rain, flooding, damage from wild
animals, or damage from birds), and drought index-based insurance. Although premiums
vary by crop, location, and level of coverage, insurance is available throughout Senegal.
The Senegalese Government provides 50% subsidies on all premiums (Ndiaye 2009).
In late 2009, CNAAS began an education and awareness campaign about its
products in villages throughout Senegal. According to Ndiaye, CNAAS holds
information sessions in different regions, explaining its products and allowing farmers to
ask questions. Senegalese famers are unfamiliar with insurance and often weary of
insurers, whom most only know if a relative who has had a poor experience with one
after a car accident (car insurance is the only mandatory insurance in Senegal). Despite
these challenges, Ndiaye says that Senegalese farmers are very interested in CNAAS’s
products. The company has not yet sold a significant number of contracts, but he believes
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that sales will increase and that CNAAS will achieve its goal of having local branches
throughout Senegal (2010).
Although CNAAS can be commended as a first step toward developing
agricultural insurance in Senegal, there are many problems with its design and
implementation. These problems include:


Inexperience with agricultural insurance: The World Bank study notes that
CNAAS needs significant technical assistance (technical, financial, and
operational), which is currently limited in Senegal (Mahul et al 2009). CNAAS is
the first company of its kind to be establishing in West Africa, and its
administrators do not have experience in agricultural experience.



Vague business plan and poorly-defined products: The issue above is linked to the
vagueness of CNAAS’s business plan. CNAAS states that it insures a wide
variety of crops, locations, and indemnification levels. It does not appear,
however, to have developed an understanding of the risk of this product portfolio;
it is unlikely that its current product line is actuarially sound. Its strategy of trying
to cover the maximum number of farmers with poorly defined products may
exceed its institutional capacity. If it defaults on the payment of claims, farmers
will loose trust in agricultural insurance, stunting or entirely debilitating its longterm development. These problems are likely at least partially due to the rapid
speed with which CNAAS has been approved, developed, and launched.



Reliance on Senegalese Government: The Senegalese Government has a 35%
stake in CNAAS, investing $1.1 million in its establishment (Ndiaye 2009). The
Government is responsible for paying 50% subsidies on farmers’ premiums; for
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the first year of its operations, CNAAS estimates that these subsidies will total
$2.7 million (Mahul et al 2009). This amount will grow as more farmers purchase
insurance, increasing the contribution of the Senegalese Government each year.
Given the constant financial stress faced by the Government and lessons from
international experience with agricultural insurance, this reliance is unwise.
Furthermore, the Meteorological Service of the Senegalese Government provides
weather data to CNAAS. According to a source knowledgeable in this field, the
Government has misreported agricultural statistics for the past two years and has
an incentive to do so when altering statistics impacts its costs and revenues.
Misreporting could result in manipulations of payouts to farmers.


Lack of understanding of farmers’ needs and demand for agricultural insurance:
CNAAS is trying to achieve near blanket coverage of Senegalese farmers by
offering a wide variety of products with different levels of coverage. A diverse
product offering will not increase uptake, however, if products do not meet the
needs of Senegalese farmers. In a 2006 survey of farmers in the central, primary
groundnut-growing region of Senegal, 71.7% of poor farmers and 68.2% of nonpoor farmers cited “Lack of seeds” as the main reason why they reduced their
cultivated area (only 8.3% of poor and 6.2% of non-poor farmers listed “Adverse
climatic conditions). Once the “Lack of seeds” concern was removed, however,
the primary response of poor farmers and secondary response of non-poor farmers
became “Adverse climatic conditions” (Mahul et al 2009). These responses
illustrate that agricultural products in isolation may not be of much interest or aid
to Senegalese farmers.
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VI. An Alternative for Senegal

The concerns about CNAAS as well as the discussion of agricultural insurance in
the preceding section demonstrate the desirability of an alternative strategy for
developing agricultural insurance and improving Senegalese farmers’ resilience to natural
catastrophes and climate change. As previously discussed, this strategy must be locationspecific, goal-oriented, integrative, and long-term, but flexible. With these criteria in
mind, a brief discussion of farmers’ needs and an interesting food security program
created by a Peace Corps Senegal volunteer will inform strategy recommendations for
Senegal.
The 2009 World Bank study includes the results of a 2004 qualitative assessment
of the principal causes of crop production losses as reported by 1500 irrigated and nonirrigated farms selected throughout Senegal. Among the non-irrigated farms, which
comprise over 95% of cropping in Senegal, drought is listed by 29% of farmers as the
most important cause (of all causes listed) of crop loss. Insects (excluding locusts) follow
at 16%, then disease with 13% (Mahul et al 2009). See Appendix B, Figure 4 for the full
chart of losses.
The World Bank study also cites a survey of groundnut farmers in the primary
groundnut-growing region of Senegal conducted in 2006. As mentioned above, farmers’
main reason for reducing cultivated area was lack of seeds, with an overwhelming 71.7%
of poor farmers and 68.2% of non-poor farmers. With this obstacle removed, among poor
farmers, the most cited reason became adverse climatic conditions (29.1%), followed by
lack of fertilizer (16.1%), followed by poor seed quality (11.6%). Among non-poor

24

Boudreau

The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania

farmers, the most cited reason became lack of fertilizer (29.7%), followed by adverse
climatic conditions (19.5%), followed by lack of equipment (11.8%) (Mahul et al 2009).
See Appendix B, Table 3 for the full table of reasons.
These surveys highlight an important point stressed in the World Bank study, that
any crop insurance program for Senegalese farmers will only be effective if it is
accompanied by timely access to improved seeds, fertilizers, and credit. Output markets
and sales prices must also be attractive to growers to make an investment in new and
potentially riskier technology attractive (2009). An interesting program started by a Peace
Corps volunteer in a village in Kolda underlines the potential of a strategy that includes
the aforementioned inputs, farmer education, and agricultural credit.
Hans Spalholz, an agriculture graduate from Cornell, volunteered with Peace
Corps in Senegal from 2007 to 2009. Hans was located in the Kolda region of southern
Senegal. When Hans arrived in 2007, farmers in his village were struggling to produce
enough food to feed their families; farmers’ yields were low because of soil erosion and
depletion as well as climatic variability (Peace Corps 2009). Hans began a program that
coupled access to improved inputs with education about farming techniques.
Hans began working with farmers in the dry season, meeting with them one-onone to explain the significance of proper spacing, the advantages of weeding, the
advantages of retaining manure in the fields (rather than burning it), the optimal
application of fertilizer, and the benefits of purchasing improved seed varieties. Because
farmers could not afford to purchase improved seeds and fertilizer, Hans created a loan
program where he loaned farmers money to purchase them. Typical loans ranged from
$25 to $75, and farmers had to match Hans’s contribution. Throughout the rainy season,
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Hans reviewed key points with farmers, meeting with them both in and out of the fields
to monitor their progress. Both farmers and their families were educated about proper
farming techniques. At the end of the season, farmers used the proceeds from the sale of
their harvest to repay the loans that Hans had given (Peace Corps 2009).
The combination of improved farming techniques with better seed varieties and
fertilizer application had outstanding results. Despite less favorable rains in 2008 than in
2007, maize yields were six times the previous year’s yields and millet yields were
almost doubled for farmers involved in Hans’s program. In 2007, the average yield for
maize in this village was 500 kg/ha; in 2008, it was 3125 kg/ha. For the 2008 season,
farmers that chose to participate in Hans’s program had average millet yields of 2200
kg/ha; those who did not participate averaged 1250 kg/ha. For maize, the return on
investment of participating farmers averaged 425% (Peace Corps 2009).
The success of Hans’s program helped facilitate a partnership between Peace
Corps Senegal and the United States Agency for International Develop (USAID)
focusing on long-term strategies for improving food security in Senegal (Hendrick 2010).
Although micro-lending is beyond the capacity of Peace Corps as an institution, Chris
Hendrick, the Director of Peace Corps Senegal, acknowledges that access to credit for
improved inputs is one of the crucial missing links in improving yields in Senegal (2010).
For this reason, one of the strategic focuses of the Peace Corps/USAID program is to
facilitate the expansion of rural communities’ access to appropriate sources of credit
(USAID 2009).
Although Hans’s program does not explicitly include an insurance component, it
highlights an important role for agricultural insurance to play in the first phase of
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agricultural insurance development in Senegal. As illustrated by the surveys of
Senegalese farmers summarized in the World Bank study, farmers lack access to the
credit that Hans made available to the farmers in his village. With no access to credit,
farmers lack sufficient funds to purchase improved inputs such as fertilizer and quality
seeds.
The Malawi pilot explained above illustrates how agricultural insurance can
replace Hans in opening access to improved inputs; by bundling a loan for inputs with
agricultural insurance, banks will be more willing to lend to farmers because the
insurance guarantees repayment of the loan. Without the educational component of
Hans’s program and other strategies to strengthen agricultural markets, however, a
bundled loan-insurance program will not improve the Senegalese agricultural sector in
the long-term. It should be noted, however, that institutionalizing and upscaling Hans’s
program through agricultural insurance is also insufficient without infrastructure
development and crop price stabilization. For example, if Senegalese farmers are able to
achieve anywhere near the dramatic yield increases seen in Hans’s villages, but are
unable to store their crops for later sale, prices will plummet following the harvest and
then begin to rise again during the dry season, eroding the profitability of farmers’
investments (Brown et al 2009).

VII. Proposed Strategy for Senegal

Having discussed the weak Senegalese agricultural sector, the challenges facing
this sector from climate change, the opportunities and limitations of agricultural
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insurance (exemplified through a discussion of international agricultural insurance
experiences), the stated needs of Senegalese farmers, and the potential impact of
programs combining access to inputs with farmer education, it is time to return to the four
criteria for successfully developing agricultural insurance, location-specific, integrative,
goal-oriented, and long-term, but flexible, and elaborate a strategy for Senegal.
It is helpful to begin by enumerating an initial set of goals of developing
agricultural insurance; these goals will require updating as agricultural insurance is
established. The goals stated here are aspirational goals. When an actual program is being
established, explicit goals that are difficult, but achievable, with specific metrics for
measurement must be clarified. An initial set of aspirational goals is as follows:


Enable farmers to access inputs (e.g. drought-resistant seeds, fertilizer, etc.) that
will increase resilience to natural catastrophes and provide higher-yields.



Provide farmers with coverage against catastrophic events that exacerbate the
cycle of poverty and curtail investment in higher-revenue earning crops.



Promote adaptation to climate change.



Facilitate the modernization of the Senegalese agricultural sector and contribute to
the development of stable agricultural markets that will improve food security.

It is clear that these goals will not be achieved through the use of agricultural insurance
alone; agricultural insurance must be integrated with a portfolio of complementary
strategies. Integration requires long-term collaboration among organizations working in
Senegal. There is a wide variety of organizations currently working on food security in
Senegal; however, their activities are not well-coordinated and therefore neither as
effective nor as sustainable as possible (Hendrick 2010). For this program to be impactful
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in the long-run, it will require an international organization such as the World Bank to
facilitate the involvement of governmental and non-profit aid organizations in Senegal.
As Mechler, Linnerooth-Bayer, and Peppiatt emphasize in their discussion of
disaster micro-insurance, partner organizations must be well-established in Senegal and
well-respected by the Senegalese (2006). This location-specific concern is especially
salient for purveying insurance products because the Senegalese are skeptical of
insurance companies; an agricultural insurance program will require that farmers be
educated about insurance products. The organizations working directly with rural
Senegalese must be especially well regarded; Peace Corps Senegal, for example, has been
working there since 1963 and is respected throughout the country (Peace Corps 2009).
Well-established organizations in Senegal also have insight into how to connect with
Senegalese communities. For instance, Peter Trenchard, Economic Growth Office
Director of USAID explains that because communities know that USAID is a reliable
organization, they will compete to be selected to participate in proposed USAID projects.
USAID hires facilitators from the local community that are knowledgeable in the project
field, speak the local language, and are outgoing, strong communicators; the local
community then questions the facilitators and votes on which one it wants to have work
on the project (2010).
As noted in the discussion of criteria for successfully developing agricultural
insurance, this program must be developed as a long-term strategy. The development of
agricultural insurance can be thought of in phases; as the program moves through stages,
it will be expanded, new products will be offered in regions with more experience with
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agricultural insurance, and the strategies and goals of the program will change. The
World Bank must monitor and evaluate the program’s progress on goals.
Although it is desirable and necessary for the Senegalese government to support
the program in the long-term, a public-private partnership agricultural insurance company
such as CNAAS should not be established to sell agricultural insurance. Instead, an
insurance pool of domestic insurers should be created (see Appendix C for further
discussion of the proposed insurance pool). The benefits of an insurance pool are
multifarious; a principal advantage of an insurance pool is that it spreads the risk among
insurers, which lowers costs and is most valuable in the case of an extreme natural
catastrophe that results in many claims (Leftley 2010). Furthermore, an insurance pool
would involve many insurance companies, enabling insurers to gain experience with
agricultural insurance and facilitating the development of an agricultural insurance
market in Senegal.
This proposed strategy also absolves the Senegalese Government of the
responsibility of providing 50% direct subsidies on all insurance premiums. International
experience illustrates the high-cost and ineffectiveness of high government subsidization
(Mahul et al 2009). The Senegalese Government will play, however, many other
supporting roles to the program. Initially, the Government will facilitate the
establishment of a supportive legislative framework for index-based agricultural
insurance, a key recommendation of the World Bank study (Mahul et al 2009).
The Senegalese Government can also indirectly lower premiums to farmers by
investing in infrastructure development; modernization of the weather station system, for
example, will lower basis risk and decrease premiums. Currently, basis risk posed by the

30

Boudreau

The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania

diffused weather station system is a major challenge to offering affordable insurance to
farmers (Muller 2010). Investment in storage facilities and improved roads in rural areas
will also stabilize market prices for agricultural goods. In the future, if the Senegalese
Government would like to promote the cultivation of currently underutilized high-value
crops such as cassava, sweet potato, pigeon pea, fonio, sesame, and cashew (USAID
2009), it can provide subsidies on insurance policies for these crops. In this case,
subsidies are provided for specific crops as part of economic policy to develop nascent
agricultural markets.
This proposal focuses on the long-term development of agricultural insurance; it
provides, however, the following strategy for the first phase of its development. This
strategy is based on the four goals above as well as the Malawi experience and Peace
Corps’s food security program. The most important of the four goals in this phase is to
enable Senegalese farmers to access credit to purchase improved inputs. The product is a
loan for improved inputs that is bundled with insurance so that banks will lend to farmers
to enable them to purchase improved seeds and fertilizer. The insurance is weather indexbased insurance reflective of that used in the Malawi program.
The MARCS risk assessment tool developed by the World Bank can help
determine where this product can be piloted; the World Bank finding that a weather
index-based insurance pilot for groundnuts is possible in the Nioro and Kaffrine
departments of Senegal suggest that these locations are good options (Mahul et al 2009).
Area-yield index insurance is not employed in this proposal; it has had mixed results
internationally (e.g. in countries such as India), at least partially because of delays caused
by the lengthy process involved in calculating regional average yields (2009). There are,
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however, some interesting area-yield and weather index blended insurance products
being developed; these products may be able to be introduced in Senegal in the future.
Appendix C contains an in-depth discussion of a proposed structure for the initial phase
of agricultural insurance in Senegal, including a diagram of stakeholders and their
interactions.
The duration of the initial phase will depend on the challenges that arise in its
development and the interest of Senegalese farmers. When it has been determined that the
program is ready to enter its second phase, new regions can be added and new strategies
employed in the pilot region. Before the second phase begins, the performance of the
program must be evaluated based on the metrics determined at its onset. Feedback from
farmers and surveys of their needs must be conducted. Finally, climate change impacts
must be evaluated and considered before entering a second phase of program
development.
New regions will have programming and products similar to those in the initial
pilot phase. Regions where farmers have been participating for multiple growing seasons
will continue to have bundled loan/insurance products offered, but will also begin to have
voluntary insurance products developed. These products are more reflective of those
discussed in the World Bank study; voluntary insurance products are not offered until the
second phase of program development because international experience proves that
uptake of voluntary insurance products, even when extremely beneficial to farmers, is
low (Cole et al 2009). This proposal assumes that farmers that have had positive
experiences with the program in the past and have seen improvements in their
productivity will be more apt to purchase voluntary insurance products.
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At the start of the second phase of the program, new, complementary programs
can be established in the regions that participated in the initial program phase. It is
difficult to foresee what types of programs may be beneficial for farmers; it may be
determined, for example, that a savings program is beneficial to help farmers cope with
interannual weather variability. Or, in the case that climate change has drastically altered
weather conditions, an educational campaign about adapting crop portfolios may be
valuable. These two examples illustrate the need to constantly evaluate the needs and the
challenges faced by farmers.
The further into the future one looks, the more challenges and opportunities for
the program become apparent. One clear challenge is the expense involved in upscaling
the program and offering voluntary insurance products. Because one of the strategic
focuses of this program is to facilitate adaption to climate change and to provide food
security, there may be opportunities for the program to access funds earmarked for
climate change adaptation in Senegal. The United Nations Development Project, for
example, has funds available for adaption projects through the Global Environment Fund
(GEF). Currently, Senegal does not have programming sponsored by these funds,
although GEF funds are being used to help support the food security agricultural
insurance program in Mali mentioned in Section IV (Drunet 2010). Insurance premiums
may also be lowered through cross-subsidization (i.e. premiums of non-poor farmers are
used to subsidize poor farmers). This option requires differentiation of poor and non-poor
farmers, which according to Ndiaye is not difficult in Senegal (2010), and may require a
legislative framework that requires insurers to subsidize poor farmers’ premiums with
those of non-poor farmers (e.g. current pro-poor legislation in India requires insurers to
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use premiums of wealthy clients to subsidize those of poor clients (Mechler, LinneroothBayer, and Peppiatt 2006)).
The impacts of climate change discussed in Section II, which are primary drivers
for establishing this program, will also challenge the affordability of insurance for
farmers. In theory, as climate change stress becomes more acute, premiums will rise to
reflect increased risk. This problem requires further research and product innovation;
however, if insurance products are sold only to farmers who have been educated about
improving farming techniques and adapting to climate change, then climate change risks
will be partially mitigated. New products can also directly address climate change risks.
Mahul and Stutley suggest drought adaption insurance, which could provide coverage
against risks caused by a shift from nonviable farming to viable (agricultural and
nonagricultural) businesses. The product would protect farmers against new sources of
risks resulting from a change to farming practices that are more drought resilient and less
water intensive. The World Bank is currently piloting these strategies with the
government of India (2010).
Another innovation that should be considered in future phases of agricultural
insurance in Senegal is long-term, or multi-year, insurance contracts. These contracts
would be reflect the approach that Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan develop for long-term
homeowners’ insurance for residential property. They propose that long-term insurance
contracts (LTI) can address the problem of volatility of insurance premiums and
homeowners’ failure to protect their property against disaster (2009). Although LTI could
not currently work in Senegal because of farmers’ lack of experience with insurance
products, in the future, innovation on multi-year agricultural insurance contracts could
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benefit farmers. LTI would help to smooth price volatility for yearly insurance contracts;
for example, if insurers are able to access seasonal weather forecasts predict a drought
year, they may raise premiums to unaffordable levels for farmers. A multi-year contract
can help to address this problem by pooling the predicted risk for the covered time
period.
One foreseeable application of LTI in agriculture in Senegal is bundled
loan/insurance for agricultural equipment. As noted in Section VI, in the 2006 survey of
groundnut farmers, once the “Lack of seeds” hurdle was removed, 11.8% of non-poor
farmers cited “Lack of equipment” as the main reason for reducing cultivated area
(Mahul et al 2009). Non-poor farmers unable to access credit for expensive equipment
purchases could benefit from a contract that bundled the loan with LTI so that farmers
could repay the loan over multiple growing seasons, with insurance covering his
payments or enabling him to delay repayment without penalty in the case of drought.

VIII. Concluding Remarks

The strategy articulated for Senegal in this research paper is by no means a
comprehensive strategy ready for immediate implementation. There are many challenges
to developing agricultural insurance in Senegal, and not all of them are addressed by this
proposal. This proposal does consider, however, certain options that are not currently
discussed as part of agricultural insurance development in Senegal. The goal of this paper
is to spur discussion about the implications of the proposed strategy for the development
of agricultural insurance in Senegal as well as to raise consideration of how the ideas
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offered above can be incorporated into the development of agricultural insurance
programs in Senegal and more broadly in other developing countries.
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Appendix A

Figure 1: Evolution of “Great Natural Catastrophes” Worldwide, 1950-2007, Economic
vs. Insured Impact (U.S. $ billion indexed to 2007)

Source: Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2008
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Table 1: The 40 Most Devastating Disasters Ranked by Number of Victims, 1970-2007

Source: Hochrainer et al, 2009
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Table 2: Examples of the Impact of Disasters on Economies of Different Sizes

Source: Cummins and Mahul, 2008
Figure 2: 2005 Rainfall Map of Senegal (mm)

Note: Left and bottom axes represent, respectively, degrees of longitude and latitude.
Source: Official website of the Senegalese government:
http://www.gouv.sn/meteo/precipitations.html
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Table 3: Senegal: Average Annual Rainfall for Selected Departments according to N-S
Geographical Location

Source: Mahul et al, 2009
Table 4: Cultivated Area Main Crops, 2005/06 to 2007/08 (hectares)

Source: Mahul et al, 2009
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Figure 3: National Average Yields Major Crops, 1970/71 to 2007/08 (kg/ha)

Source: Mahul et al 2009
Figure 4: Course grain yield statistics from five selected countries from the United
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization

Source: Brown, Hintermann, and Higgins, 2009
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Figure 5: Change in temperature and rainfall for Africa, between 1980-1999 and 20802099 for scenario A1B, averaged over 21 Atmosphere-Ocean General Circulation
Models.

Source: Conway 2009
Figure 6: Climatic Zones of West Africa

Source: Perret 2008
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Appendix B

Figure 1: Index-based agricultural insurance product

Payout

Maximum
Payout

Trigger
Level

Exit
Level

Index

Table 1: Examples of agricultural insurance programs in developing countries
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Name/Provider

Country

Inception Year
Default year,
completion of
pilot, or
continuation
of program

WINCROP
(Windward
Islands Crop
Insurance)
Dominica,
Grenada, St.
Vincent, St.
Lucia
1988

The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania

BASIX/KBS

World Bank
CRMG Pilot
Program

World Bank
CRMG Pilot
Program

United Nations
Development
Program Pilot

India
2003

Malawi
2005

Ethiopia
2006

Mali
2010

Development
continues

First stage of
pilot

Cooperatives sell
products

Products sold
through MFIs,
unknown model

Cooperatives
distributed
products

MFIs wellregarded in
communities

Cooperatives

Disintegrating

Continues

Full-service

Partner agent,
individual
registration

bananamarketing
organizations

Rural
microfinance
organization
(BASIX) and
rural bank KBS

Established by
farmer-members
of organizations

No participation

Continues,
upscaling
Loan through
MFI, MFI
purchases
insurance,
NASFAM works
with farmers
Local farmers'
clubs and
National
Smallholder
Farmers'
Association of
Malawi
(NASFAM)
Yes: groundnut
farmers
organized by
National
Smallholder
Farmers'
Association of
Malawi
(NASFAM)

Compulsory for
organization
members in all
but St. Lucia
(voluntary)

Voluntary

Bundled
contract: farmers
receive hybrid
groundnut
seeds, insurance
on loan for seeds

Farmer purchase
index-based
insurance on
crops

No participation
Unknown,
although project
goals to develop
insurance
products and
unlock access to
credit

5% of sales

255-900
rupees/year; 3%
of insured value

6-10% of insured
assets

Unknown

Products in
design stage

Delivery Model

Role of
Administrator
in Community

Community
Participation
in scheme

Product type

Premium
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Cover

20% of loss of
deliveries

8,000-30,000
rupees

When rainfall
index hits trigger,
borrower pays
fraction of loan
due and insurer
pays the rest
directly to bank

Likely

Unknown, likely
Index-based, no
moral hazard

Likely, although
some basis risk
Index-based, no
moral hazard

Risks covered
well modeled?

Incentives
prevention?
Clients

Somewhat

13,000 (2004)

Index-based

~7,700

982 (2005), 2536
(2006)

Yes, Indian
insurer ICICI
Lombard

Insurance
Association of
Malawi (IAM) -consortium of
Malawi's leading
insurers

Initial pilot 28
farmers
Ethiopian
Insurance
Corporation
(state-owned
insurance
company)
selected for pilot

Yes,
international
reinsurer

Unclear;
probably
purchased by
insurer

Small size of
pilot program
enabled EIS to
retain risk

Yes: Commodity
risk management
group (CRMG) of
World Bank
contributed
technical
assistance to set
up

Yes: World Bank
technical
assistance,
catalyzing
function

Insurance
Company
Involvement

Yes

Unknown
Difficulty
obtaining
adequate
weather data

Reinsurance

Assistance

Yes: 85% of
portfolio
reinsured
internationally
Yes: Because
WINCROP
required to settle
claims within 38
days,
governments
have standby
$7.5 mil fund
until reinsurance
available

Government
Role

Major event
experienced?

Yes

Unknown

Provide weather
data; no direct
subsidization

Yes: between
1988-2004, total
of $75mil paid for
267 events

Smaller events
with payouts

Small payouts in
some regions

World Bank
CRMG provided
technical
assistance and
administrated
scheme
Supporting
functions through
insurance,
weather data,
and regulatory
framework

No

Products in
design stage

Yes
Index-based
Cotton farmers
(first stage), will
be expanded to
rice, maize, and
peanut farmers

Allianz Mali, local
insurer, has
license to
distribute
products
Swiss Re
reinsurer for all
agricultural
insurance
programs

UNDP, Oxfam,
Planet
Guarantee, 2
other NGOs
In-kind support
through
supportive
legislation and
weather data

No
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Outlook (plan
for commercial
viability?)

Other
weaknesses

Viability
challenged as
banana exports
and profitability
decreasing
High premiums
and low payouts
have lead to
farmer
disengagement - where voluntary
in St. Lucia
farmers have
opted out, others
are in arrears

Other
strengths

Provides funds
quickly to clients
after loss
Other
information

Difficult to
maintain scheme
because
reinsurance too
expensive for
multi-crop
systems,
government
subsidies
demanded but
not implemented

The Wharton School
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Quick upscaling,
large demand,
premiums
substantial
Eligibility is
limited to farmers
with crop loans
issued by KBS;
many farmers
listed previous
years claim
payouts as
reason for joining
Significant efforts
have been made
to offer a
transparent
product
customized to
each location,
crop, and
community
Clients value the
quick payouts
available when
index is
triggered,
although no
changes in
farming practices
(moves to
higher-risk,
higher-yield
crops) have
been recorded,
they are
expected

Should lead to
higher yieldhigher risk
activities but no
evidence yet;
premiums
substantial

Certified seed
packages did not
germinate well,
had potential to
erode trust in
scheme
Increased
access to credit
for farmers; high
cost of loan
interest and
insurance
premium
outweighed by
improved
productivity

Couples
microlending
with mandatory
crop insurance:
purchase
insurance when
taking loan and
premium is paid
with loan
payments

Much work
needed on
product and
availability; 2006
offering of similar
product had very
low uptake

Too early to
predict

Cooperatives
lack technical
capacity to sell
products, much
"training of
trainers"
required, much
education of
farmers needed

Too early to
predict

Products seen
as desirable in
current climatic
conditions

All organizations
involved in pilot
have extensive
experience
working in this
field (barring
MFIs)

Rainfall deficit
product for
maize first
product piloted

Examining both
average-yield
based index and
rainfall-based
index products,
goal of project to
improve food
security

Source: Author
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Figure 2: Logistics of the Malawi pilot insurance scheme

Source: Suarez et al 2007
Table 2: The economics of the insurance/loan/seed package

Source: Suarez et al 2007
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Figure 3: Portfolio of proposed strategies for climate change adaption in Maharashtra,
India.

Source: Economics of Climate Adaptation Working Group 2009

54

Boudreau

The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania

Figure 4: Causes of Loss in Rain-fed Crops

Source: Mahul et al 2009
Table 3: Main Reason Given by Farmers in Groundnut Basin for Reducing their
Cultivated Area

Source: Mahul et al 2009
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Appendix C

Insurance
Pool

Senegalese Government
Météo Sénégal
Direction des Assurances

Technical Partner

External assistance
to program

Infrastructure Investments

MFIs

Farmers’
Organizations

Partner Organizations

Stakeholder involvement in the initial phase of agricultural insurance development in
Senegal:


Insurance Provider: Insurance Pool consisting of the 13 members of the
Fédération Sénégalaise des Sociétés d’Assurance (FSSA) that offer property
insurance. Percentage stakes will vary according to size of the insurer. There are
two options for the administration of the pool’s business: 1) Allianz Assurances or
2) a technical partner. Allianz Assurance is selected as administrator for three
reasons: 1) it has experience with agricultural insurance in other developing
countries, including a current pilot program with cotton in Mali (Planet Guarantee
2009); 2) it has publically stated its commitment to developing micro-insurance,
including agricultural insurance (Anthony 2008); and 3) its Senegal life insurance
division has already developed at least three products with Planet Guarantee in
Senegal that are in the market (Blaziat 2010). Allianz’s size and international
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presence are also assets. If Allianz is selected as the administrator, however, then
extensive technical training would be required because its Senegal division lacks
experience with agricultural insurance. Option 2 is discussed below. Reinsurance
layers will be purchased.


Technical Partner: During the start-up phase of this program, it would likely be
very desirable to have an experienced technical partner. A technical partner would
be responsible for designing products that meet farmers’ needs, working with
partner organizations to administer the product, and coordinating with insurance
companies when claims are filed; put simply, this partner would be the “back
office” of the program. There are numerous well-known firms and non-profit
organizations (NGOs) that are insurance intermediaries. Planet Guarantee is an
NGO with an established base in Dakar that is currently acting as the technical
partner in an agricultural insurance pilot program in Mali; although Planet
Guarantee Senegal does not have experience working with agricultural insurance,
they have partnerships with multiple credible MFIs and Allianz as well as
experience in the Senegalese market (Sow 2010). MicroEnsure is a for-profit firm
with a well-developed back office process for administering micro-insurance.
MicroEnsure is currently piloting programs in Tanzania and Rwanda (Leftley
2010). Although MicroEnsure does not have experience in the Senegalese market,
its expertise would be an asset to the program.



A third option for the technical administration of the program is to develop the
program with a technical partner with a fixed duration contract (e.g. 4, 5, or 6
years) while insurers build technical capacity; at the end of the contract, technical
administration transfers to the insurance pool. This option has pros and cons. The
immediate benefit is that the program is launched with an experienced technical
team. Because there will likely be many initial problems, this advantage will be
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valuable. Another benefit is that less initial training is required, allowing for a
more immediate program launch and enabling the insurance pool a generous
timeline to develop its technical capacity. A clear disadvantage of this strategy is
that with the technical partner acting as the interface between the MFIs and the
insurance pool, these stakeholders do not gain experience working together. There
are ways to circumvent this problem, but it should be recognized. Another
potential problem is the loss of technical capacity when this responsibility is
transferred to the insurance pool; if the technical partner employs processes that it
is unable or unwilling to transmit to insurance pool administrators at the end of its
contract, the result could be mismanagement that undermines the program.


Micro-finance Institutions: Micro-finance is well established in West Africa, and
there are several credible MFIs operating in Senegal. MFIs are good distributors
of agricultural insurance products because they have a presence in rural areas and
are trusted by the Senegalese (Sow 2010). Furthermore, MFI partners will be
necessary in order to pair agricultural insurance with loans for inputs, an essential
component of this proposal. MFI partners will vary depending on the region in
Senegal; MFIs must be well-established in their communities, have low
delinquency and default rates, and possess adequate resources to participate in the
program. Mutual saving organizations are also established in many regions in
Senegal; these organizations are capitalized by their members and offer credit
lines to their members. Although these organizations may be potential partners in
this program, they vary greatly in size and capacity and so should be wellreviewed before partnerships are established.



Senegalese Government: Although the Senegalese Government does not play a
direct role in the structure of the program, it plays multiple important facilitating
roles in support of it. One of the objectives of the program will be to remain
affordable for farmers without direct subsidization of premiums; minimally,
premiums must reflect the farmers’ pure risk. Furthermore, if the integrity of its
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data can be insured, the Agence Nationale de la Météorologie (Météo) can
provide the weather data to lower expenses that would be reflected in the
administrative gross-up of the premium. The Direction des Assurances (DA) can
also facilitate the program’s development by building a supportive regulatory
framework and working with CIMA, the West and Central African insurance
regulator, to develop index-based insurance (Mahul et al 2009).


Farmers’ Organizations: It may be financially and/or logistically necessary to
partner with farmers’ organizations to distribute the insurance. This option may be
desirable if farmers’ organizations are organized and have relationships with
farmers who otherwise would not partake in the scheme (i.e. farmers who would
be hesitant if approached by an MFI or “external” partner). The role of farmers’
organizations will vary depending on region and insurance type. One option that
can be evaluated for regions where basis risk poses a serious problem is selling
group policies to a local farmer’s organization; aggregating the individual farmers
into one larger policy will pool their risk and better reflect the region’s weather
index. The farmer’s organization is be responsible for distributing any payouts to
members or redistributing profits from crop sales (this option transfers a portion
of the basis risk to the farmers’ organization) (Muller 2010).



Partner Organizations: This proposal advances an official partnership between
this program and the Global Food Security Response Partnership Program, a
collaboration between the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) and the Senegal Peace Corps. This Program leverages funding from
USAID to enable Peace Corps members in rural villages to promote food security
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through a number of strategies, including education about proper farming
techniques and the benefits of purchasing improved seed varieties and fertilizers
(USAID 2009). In the partnership, Peace Corps volunteers would work with
farmers offered the bundled loan/insurance contract that enables farmers to
purchase improved inputs and protects them in case of natural catastrophe.
Linking the agricultural insurance program with the Peace Corps, one of the bestknown and well-regarded aid organizations in Senegal, will be valuable for
gaining the interest and the trust of the Senegalese. Experience with this
partnership will inform strategies for partnering with other organizations.
Partnering with these types of organizations will benefit all stakeholders in the
program because improving farmers’ agricultural practices improves their yields
and increases their resilience to natural catastrophes, which lowers insurers’ risk
exposure (and subsequently, premiums). For this reason, partner organizations
will need to communicate with the insurance provider so that the provider is
aware of agricultural improvements that impact risk loading.


External Assistance (e.g. World Bank): Even if a technical partner is involved in
the program, assistance from an organization experienced in constructing
agricultural programs is necessary. A long-term external partner acting as a
consultant is necessary to monitor, evaluate, and update the program.



Reinsurance: In the initial phase, the number of policies sold will be so small that
the insurance pool may be able to retain the program’s risk in house. As the
program grows, however, reinsurance layers must be purchased. International
reinsurers such as Swiss Re and Munich Re are both active in this market.
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